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Abstract:
The rhetoric of logic reveals, we claim, that arguments are about force, ending only when one side
submits. Rhetoricians, it is countered, are content to persuade, settling for agreement when truth is
wanted—and all is fair in pursuit of consent.
The choice between conceptual rape and seduction is a false choice. It is time to cut against the
grain. We are distracted by the rhetoric of logic and gloss the logic of rhetoric. Rhetorical models
for pluralistic discourses are vital, but fail as regulative ideals. The ideology of logic's rhetoric is
unacceptable, but it is not immutable—so there may be a way out.
***

I know I am in good company when I admit that I find the arguments between post-Modernists and Realists very
confusing. And the more I listen, the more confused I get. Now I am fully willing to accept that most of the
responsibility for my own confusion falls on me, but I can't help but think that some of the things that are said on
behalf of one side or the other are inherently confusing on their own merits. Still, this could all have been
expected since half the disputants embrace the polysemy of interpretation as a discursive virtue and so explicitly
disavow precision and clarity of expression as ideals, while the other half condemns ambiguity as a cardinal sin
and so insists on the procrustean bed of bivalence in which the only escape from determinable truth or falsity is
utter nonsense. There is, in short, a very great chasm between them and very little genuine engagement across
that divide.
As appealing as it would be to enter into the partisan fray—but perhaps more appealing still to sit this one out
entirely and declare a pox on both their houses—what I really want to do is satisfy the contradictory desiderata
of both camps because there are compelling reasons from both directions. Interpretation is indeed a pluralistic
matter, and there are no intellectual activities that are interpretation free; but there are constraints on the
interpretations that are open to us in any given area, and sometimes those very real constraints constitute very
realist contours. But is it even possible to be a post-Modern Realist, or a pluralistic Foundationalist? Could there
be any better sign that something has gone wrong than that we are attracted in apparently opposite directions?
On the analysis that will be proposed here, there are two things at fault: the faulty internal logic of rhetoric and the
faulty external rhetoric of logic. What I hope to be able to do is explain how and why these polar opposites
attract us, as well as where and when they become too extreme. Afterwards, the recent, but already notorious,
article in Social Text by the physicist Alan Sokal—and the responses to it—will be used as a test case or vehicle
for applying the analysis. (Of course, since I also hope to do all this in the thirty minutes allotted to me, I will have

to over simplify the presentations of realism and post-modernism and gloss over some important caveats. And I'll
still have to talk way too fast.)

I. The faulty logic of rhetoric.
What I mean by the "logic of rhetoric" is simply the structures that govern the primarily interpretive domains of
intellectual activity (roughly, Mill's moral sciences, which became Hegel's Geistes-wissenschaften). When we
come to theorize about a phenomenon—i.e., when we try to make sense of part of the world—we have a wide
variety of resources at our disposal: the wisdom of the ages, the testimony of our senses, formal calculi, and, if
we're so blessed, divine inspiration or plain common sense. In some contexts, we may be constrained by certain
givens—the undeniable empirical data or the text at hand, established legal structures and precedent, the
demands of logical consistency, or the dictates of orthodox dogma. In other contexts, limits might be met by the
lack of any such data, formal criteria, or precedent. The limiting cases, if there are any, would be those in which
our theories are uniquely determined by those givens. The classical empiricist ideal would have it that pure logic
and neutral evidence ought to suffice. They rarely do, of course, which is why classical empiricism is "classical"
rather than contemporary. Interpretive contexts are those in which evidence and logic do not suffice. Put
positively, those contexts require something more, a creative element. That must be contributed by the critic. This
is all best illustrated by reference to criticism and interpretation.
The salient point about the interpretation of a literary text is that even the best of them have to share the field.
One answer to the question of what Homer's Odyssey, for example, is about, is that it is all about Greek
ethnocentrism and cultural imperialism (as when a Cyclopes can be blinded with moral impunity since he's not a
fully civilized human being, but a barbarian who gathers rather than raises crops and who even lives with his
livestock). That may be a good answer but it does not preclude also interpreting it in other ways, e.g., as the
expression of a male mid-life fantasy ("Honest, Honey, I really was trying to get home on time, but it's just that,
you know, after the boys and I had this war, some goddess kept me as a sex slave on her island paradise!"). The
merit of a literary text is partly measured by the interpretations it supports. The truly great texts speak anew to
every generation.
A reader who insists on asking, "But what is The Odyssey really about?" has missed this point. Texts are not in
themselves uniquely about anything. Or, better, they can be read as about many different things. This is an
important fact about interpretation, but how we should respond to it is a matter for great debate. There are two
responses that I find particularly wrongheaded: one by Professor Morris Zapp, the other by Professor Jacques
Derrida.
Morris Zapp is fictitious, a character who lives only in the texts of David Lodge's comic novels. (Of course, since
"Il n'y a pas de hors-texte," it wouldn't be unfair to say that Professor Derrida lives only in texts, too!) In one of
the novels, Professor Zapp described himself this way:
"I used to be a Jane Austen man. I think I can say in all modesty that I was the Jane Austen
man. I wrote five books on Jane Austen, every one of which was trying to establish what her
novels meant—and, naturally, to prove that no one had properly understood what they
meant before. Then I began a commentary on the works of Jane Austen, the aim of which
was to be utterly exhaustive, to examine the novels from every conceivable angle—historical,
biographical, rhetorical, mythical, structural, Freudian, Jungian, Marxist, existentialist,

Christian, allegorical, ethical, phenomenological, archetypal, you name it. So that when each
commentary was written, there would be nothing further to say about the novel in
question."1
What is wrong with this picture? If different perspectives give a different interpretation, why couldn't there be a
single multi-perspectival interpretation that is complete, taking all of them into account? We do seem to accept
that there is a complete and consistent story to be told about, say, an object like the sun which appears small and
yellow from one angle but large and orange from another, stationary within one frame while in motion from
another. What is the difference?
Well, consider a different sort of text: the score to a song, say, "My Favourite Things" from the Broadway
musical The Sound of Music by Rodgers and Hammerstein. It is an innocuous little ditty, mostly heard now only
in elevators. And yet, there is a remarkable rendition by the great John Coltrane. What he has done is taken a
text—the Richard Rogers score—and given it his own interpretation. Coltrane's version is brilliant, a hard act to
follow, but someday, someone will follow it, and maybe even surpass it. The jazz version may have been, at one
time, the latest word, but it could not possibly be the last word.
Zapp is wrong in thinking that there can be a complete story for the same reasons that anyone would be wrong in
thinking there could be a definitive performance of a song. Art is not like that. The next generations will have to
play it again, for themselves.
It might be objected that I have confused the song itself, as embodied in the score, with its various renditions.
That is an important distinction, but the same distinction applies to literary texts. The words on the page, no less
than the notes on the sheet, need to be interpreted. Each reading of a text—or performance of a score—
produces its own interpretation. The words themselves do not uniquely determine the meaning that a reader will
take away from the text, and they are not the only thing that goes into determining that meaning. Indeed,
someone can know all the details of The Odyssey's text—exactly how many times each letter and word appears,
and where—and still be without any real understanding of it. The analogy between critical readings and cover
performances holds this far, and even a bit further.
Listen again to what Coltrane has done. He has used the old text but to his own ends. Isn't that just what literary
critics do to written texts? They take an existing text, add their own embellishments, in their own styles, and all to
their own ends. In sum, they produce their own new texts that happen to use other texts as the occasions for
their production. And, as often happens in the musical context, the new text might, for some purposes, be as
good or even better than the original. When that is the case, that new text will occasion yet further texts. Since
original texts are themselves ineluctably intertextual, they have essentially the same genesis. The difference has
disappeared.
In order to see critical essays this way, as original texts in their own right, the conventional boundary between
text and criticism has to be transgressed. This can lead to extremes, however, because there appear to be no
theoretical grounds for blurring that boundary that do not at the same time efface all boundaries between genres
—including the musical distinction between composition and performance and the disciplinary distinction
between literature and science.
And that brings us to Professor Derrida, who would balk at the thought that there is a complete story to tell even
about something as concrete as the sun. Isn't everything a text, the sun included? Mass and momentum, space
and time, and cosmic origins and destiny are the vocabulary of but one solar story. What about its symbolic

significance for religion, its role in biology, and, of course, its place in literature? The sun is at the centre of a lot
of stories. Some are incompatible—e.g., Kepler's story with its elliptical orbits and Galileo's with its circular
ones; others are commensurable—e.g., Kepler's heliocentric model and Tycho Brahe's so-called Egyptian
system in which the sun orbits the earth, but all other planets orbit the sun; and others still are incommensurable
—e.g., Kepler's mystical cosmology and the mechanical cosmology that later astronomers wanted Kepler to
have had.
There are two facts to keep in mind: First, the fact that multiple interpretations are possible, and that multiple
perspectives are even called for, does not mean that all interpretations are possible. Although many things go, it
does not follow that anything goes. The immediate question, then, is who decides? Is that a descriptive or
prescriptive question? What does happen, as Kuhn has taught us, is that it is the institutions of the relevant
communities—be they literary, scientific, or philosophical—that judge theories acceptable or not.
Second, the fact that anything can be regarded as a text—i.e., something subject to interpretation—does not
mean that everything is a text. The reasoning looks patent, even syllogistic:
A text is whatever is subject to interpretation;
Everything can be subjected to interpretation;
Therefore, everything is a text.
Yes, everything can be textualized, put into context, but that just means that everything is "textable" not that
everything is already "textual." Recall what Wittgenstein pointed out in the Tractatus: every picture can be
regraded as a fact in its own right, but that does not mean every fact is a picture nor that every picture is true.
Any configuration of parts counts as a fact—including those complex configurations of written words, spoken
words, and painted colours that we use to represent other configurations. All of these can serve as pictures, or,
in Derrida's terms, as "texts," but not all of them do serve that way. That involves us. And not all of them are true:
that involves the world. The syllogism fails because of the ambiguous major.
The relevant parts of the logic of criticism can be summarized as follows (I hope these are all boring and noncontroversial):
The Logic of Criticism
LC1. The existence of a satisfactory, insightful, or compelling interpretation does not preclude the possibility of
other satisfactory, insightful, or compelling interpretations.
LC2. Satisfactory, insightful, or compelling interpretations may be incompatible, inconsistent, and even
incommensurable with one another.
LC3. Some interpretations may be better than others. Not all interpretations are equally satisfactory, insightful, or
compelling.
LC4. There can be unacceptable interpretations.
LC5. Asking what a text is "really about" is itself an interpretive question, and may not have a single answer.
LC6. There can be no last word, no definitive or final interpretation; the critical enterprise is a permanent part

of the human condition.
Zapp was wrong in thinking that there could be a final story about a story. That some interpretations are better
than others does not mean that there has to be a best of all possible interpretations. The existence of critical
standards entails neither a single 'true' interpretation nor a single all-encompassing truth of the matter.
Realism does not follow. On the other hand, Derrida is equally wrong in thinking that there are only stories. Yes,
there will always be another story to tell about a good story, just as there will always be space for new versions
of an old song, but that does not mean that there never really was a single score for that song. Critical pluralism
does not entail anti-realism.
What is more important for present purposes is the logic of rhetoric which is implicit in the logic of criticism and
revealed in critical practice. Since the evidence provided by texts is never univocal, and the task of constructing
an interpretation is a creative one for which there can be no algorithmic—or "logical"—procedure, then
comparative evaluations of interpretations is also an extra-logical matter: a matter to be decided by whichever
rhetorical strategies are most effective within the relevant discourse circles. The following principles—now
controversial but no longer boring—can be extracted:
The Implicit Logic of Rhetoric
LR1. The only grounds for preferring one interpretation to another are rhetorical.
LR2. Rhetorical grounds are always defeasible.
LR3. Thus, there can be no absolutely unacceptable interpretations, only rhetorically defeated interpretations—
and that status is mutable.
Note what has happened: the critical principle of interpretive pluralism has been elevated from a methodological
imperative about rhetoric to the metaphysical thesis of anti-Realism. The result is the rejection of LC4 in favour
of the implausible LR3. The logic of rhetoric carried to this extreme cannot accommodate substantial or dogmatic
metaphysical theses of any stripe. As interpretations of the world, they are unacceptable: the insights that made
them seem compelling have, in the end, produced an unsatisfactory result.

II. The faulty rhetoric of logic.
The Realist counterarguments to the post-Modern embrace of rhetoric are characterized by an extreme ideology
of its own, one that rejects rhetoric entirely. Indeed, the ideology is implicated in the very concept of a
counterargument. Arguments are conceived in two different ways. The "official" line is that arguments are
sustained chains of inferences connected by objective, impersonal, and dispassionate logic. They are, in short,
constructions of Pure Rationality. (Yeah, right!) The de facto conception of argument implicit in this, however, is
something else. Arguments are verbal wars. They are adversarial moments in discourse with winners and losers.
Good arguments are powerful, on target, with lots of punch, and maybe even knockouts or killers unless
unbreachable defenses can withstand the assaults or the counterattacks are even stronger. All is fair in love
and argument.
As much as the rhetoric of logic implicates the argument-as-war paradigm,2 that paradigm implicates a realist

metaphysics. The bivalence of winners and losers becomes a bivalence of truth and falsity, as well as an excluded
middle. The middle ground of compromise is discouraged as a no man's land of neither true nor false-or worse,
in the patriarchal mode, a woman's land of subjectivity, emotion, or other forms of non-cognitive nonsense:

The Rhetoric of Logic
RL1. Arguments are essentially adversarial discourse events, with winners and losers.
RL2. There are objective criteria for deciding the outcome. (That is, winners are Winners.)
RL3. Thus, the bivalence of winners and losers is tantamount to, or evidence of, a bivalence of True and False.
RL4. Refutation is objective. Refuted theories are objectively False.
RL5. There is no middle. Whatever is not victorious or defeated—or at least a contestant, and thus possibly
victorious or defeated (read: verifiable or falsifiable)—is nonsense.
The rhetoric is objectionable on various grounds—e.g., social, ethical, politico-pragmatic, and (I think
especially) pedagogical ones3—but there is an easy way out, a way to weather those objections: it is, after all,
just the rhetoric of logic that is problematic, the window dressing, and not the real thing itself. The rhetoric of
logic is mutable. The adversarial nature of arguments may be a feature of the primary metaphors we use to
conceptualize argumentation, but it is not essential. The metaphor is so entrenched, however, that it is hard to see
our way around it, and hard to see that there is this way out. Arguments need to be conceptualized in other
ways. We need new metaphors.
Despite all this, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that meta-physical realism by itself has no great
epistemological consequences. In particular, it does not entail that there is a theory-neutral observational
vocabulary. All that scientific realism really requires is that there is a world for which there could be a theoryneutral description. But the sense of "could" here leaves itself open to all manner of interpretation. The possibility
need not even be accessible to humans, being instead something we can aim for but never reach, or approach
but never attain. That is, like belles lettres critical readings and musical cover performances, there might not be
any last word in science.
There needs to be a caveat added to this. If there can be no last word in science, it would be for very different
reasons than in the critical and musical cases, because the phenomena itself are very different. In the interpretive
cases, the open-endedness arises from the inexhaustible possibility for new genres, new vocabularies, and new
perspectives. Perhaps those same considerations apply to the case of scientific theories—certainly some have
argued for that—but the open-endedness implicated by the rhetoric of logic arises from the inexhaustibility of any
single vocabulary. Further refinement, greater exactitude. and more precise articulation is always possible. The
scientific story is generically a story of progress. Of course, it is "progress" in a curious and problematic sense
of the word—"curious" because it is hard to make sense of the claim that we are getting closer to an infinitely
distant target; and "problematic" because if hard bivalence is taken seriously, then scientific stories in progress
could never really be literally true. They would have to be false, or worse.
To make this explicit:

The Ideology of Scientific Realism
SR1. There is a complete, definite truth of the matter, a "God's eye story," to be told about the world.
SR2. Ultimately, this Truth may be inaccessible, but it can at least be approached indefinitely, asymptotically.
Success may be impossible, but progress is always possible.
SR3. Thus, no last word can be expected; the scientific enterprise is a permanent feature of the human
condition.
Do not confuse LC6 and SR3! One is about the permanent possibility of new vocabularies; the other is about the
permanent possibility of new or better uses for the given vocabulary. Their superficial similarity invites seeing
them as part of the same philosophical parcel, but they have to be paid for separately.

III. A case study:
Last summer, an article appeared by the physicist Alan Sokal entitled "Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a
Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity." He wrote it as a hoax, a parody of post-Modernism,
complete with all the right jargon, all the requisite inter-textuality—a ten page bibliography doing fair justice to the
field, and ten more pages of dense footnotes—and especially all the academically correct political conclusions.
What it did not have, according to Sokal, was anything like reasoned arguments or a trace of evidence for any of
its assertions. It had only deftly deployed jargon and apt allusions.
The ensuing brouhaha was a classic academic cacophony. Sokal either exposed the vacuity of Science Studies in
particular and the Humanities and Social Sciences in general or else he didn't, producing a straw man of the
worst sort. He produced a brilliant piece of biting satire, a time-honored prerogative of the essayist unless it was
an incoherent and shoddy failure of an attempt published only out of a sort of affirmative action for scientists in a
venue in which they are not often heard. He challenged the political left, in order to provoke an intellectual house
cleaning or he provided more ammunition for right-wing anti-humanism. It was an indefensible, if not altogether
unethical, violation of academic protocol or just possibly an inadvertent but partly successful contribution to the
discussion of science's location in the larger culture!
What was it really all about—science studies, the social production of knowledge, science and anti-science, the
privileged position of the natural sciences in our universities, the lack of intellectual rigor in the humanities, the
politics of post-Modernism, or what? As we know, but too often forget, asking what a text is "really about" is
generally pointless. Publishing this article caused a lot of other things to happen, including the appearance in print,
across the airwaves, and on the internet of a whole slew of interpretations and responses, a process that is by no
means over. Sokal claims that the point was primarily political—that as a member of the Old Left, he was
chagrined by the anti-scientific attitudes and accompanying intellectual sloppiness prevalent in the postModernist-dominated New Left. Noble as that may be, it is neither here nor there for present purposes. My
concern is really with the reactions to his article: the cries of "Foul!" and hoots of disapproval from some
quarters, and the squeals of delight and rounds of cheers from others. To oversimplify matters: rhetoricians have
seen it as malicious, logicians as de-licious. What I would like to suggest is that the logic of rhetoric can't really
justify this condemnation of Sokal's article, but neither can the rhetoric of logic really justify the praise of
him. There is indeed room for a new rhetoric for logic.

(i) Let me address the first part of my claim, that the logic of rhetoric can't really justify that condemnation.
The first point is that he did indeed master the game. His article was a very successful move in the "play" of this
language game—and isn't that all there is to it? Rhetoricians have almost unanimously condemned the piece, but
the piece really is a rhetorical tour de force, an impressive display of erudition, scholarship, and mastery of the
conceptual vocabulary of postmodernism. And that is quite an accomplishment! For example, the rhetorical
strategies he employs to lull the reader into accepting some of his more outrageous claims are all time-honoured
for their effectiveness (and time and again dismissed by Logicians!): copious citations of prominent or respected
figures in the field (i.e., Appeals to Authority, Bandwagon), anecdotal evidence (Hasty Generalizations),
overstating the opposition and understating nuanced alternatives (Straw Man, False Dichotomies), and, perhaps
above all, the misuse and abuse of scientific metaphors, including all the usual suspects: the Principle of
Indeterminacy, the Uncertainty Principle, the Theory of Relativity, and the more recently vogue Chaos Theory
(Equivocations, Weak Analogies).
Is it relevant that he was doing all these consciously? It would seem as though authorial intent cannot legitimately
enter into a post-Modernist assess-ment of Sokal's piece. The texts of his confession in Lingua Franca and his
Afterword4 are fair game, but only as distinct and autonomous texts. The original article by itself is already a
rare opportunity, an open invitation for deconstructionist potshots—but that, I think, would serve only to further
undermine those very critiques by emphasizing how successful the article really was! As a text that can be richly
mined, it is a Critical Theorist's motherlode. As a move in the Critical game, it was a smash, so shouldn't it be
praised not condemned?
(ii) The analysis just presented misses an important point: Sokal wasn't playing the rhetoricians' game. He was
playing a different game, so how well he did at their game is irrelevant. Succeeding in the rhetorical game isn't
something that logico-realists can call delicious. He is supposed to have exposed one game, which is to play a
different game. But according to that second game, everything in the first game is all nonsense, and not, therefore,
something that could really be done well. The situation is the reverse from what was described above: realistlogicians have praised him, but the rhetoric of logic can't really justify that praise!
What is it that Sokal can be taken as having proved? Well, if it is all nonsense, then it is not an argument of any
sort, and so cannot have proved anything. But didn't he "demonstrate" or somehow "show" the lack of any rigor
or standards in post-Modernism, the pretentiousness and wrongheadedness of those who engage in science
studies while being incompetent and ignorant about science itself, and, finally, the vacuity of postmodernism as a
tool for the political left? There are three very different claims here. There is some merit to each of them—but
some important qualifying disclaimers for each one, too.
(a) The question of the lack of standards: Sokal's achievement cannot be denied. Writing a passably coherent
post-Modern essay is no mean feat. The fact that he did it well means that there are indeed standards, and he did
in fact approach them. More to the point, some of the things he wrote aren't all that bad. Attention has focused
on the "howlers" in the article—the grossly egregious errors and the patently ludicrous claims. But part of what
made the article successful—i.e., able to get past the desk of Andrew Ross, that issue's editor—was that Sokal
didn't put the howlers up front. For good stylistic and polemical reasons, they were presented at the end of
discussions that led to them. Now, granted, anyone with even a minimum of sophistication in mathematics and
physics who was still paying attention six pages into the article would recognize the vacuity of the claim that, "the
p of Euclid and the G of Newton are now perceived in their ineluctable historicity." I agree with Sokal: if you
can't recognize that as hokum, you really have no business expecting anyone else to bother listening to whatever
you have to say about mathematics or science. The trick to being able to write something like that and get away

with it is to bury it at the end of a series of claims that, initially, are arguably plausible and technically innocuous,
but which get progressively more theoretical as they get more absurd so that the readers are not paying attention
to the technical side at all, and hearing only what they want to hear:
In this way, the infinite-dimensional invariance group erodes the distinction between observer and
observed; the p of Euclid and the G of Newton, formerly thought to be constant and universal, are
now perceived in their ineluctable historicity; and the putative observer becomes fatally decentred,
disconnected from any epistemic link to a space-time point that can no longer be defined by
geometry alone.5
"Wait a second" did he just say that p was a variable? Whatever, but there was something there that sounded
important about space-time and relativity, and that the centre cannot hold. The point is that there really are 'lines'
of reasoning here. They are not arguments in the official sense—chains of Pure Reason—but neither are they
Pure Nonsense. In fact, what they are closest to is the unofficial but de facto concept of arguments enshrined in
the rhetoric of logic!
(b) The pretentiousness of science studies: As a philosopher whose own field has an embarrassing history of
dilettantism, I am acutely sensitive to the charge. But I am also willing to face up to it when it can be pressed.
And the shoe certainly does fit many. But not all, of course. There is a parallel here to the history of Positivism
and its anti-metaphysicalism. First, just as the Logical Positivists over-stated the case in tarring all speculative
philosophers with a brush that some, perhaps even many, thoroughly deserved, so too, the conclusion that
science studies is all hokum is equally unwarranted. Second, as unlamented as the death of Positivism may be, it
must be admitted that the Positivist critique of metaphysics has had a good, healthy effect in the long run. We
have not abandoned metaphysics, but perhaps we are a bit more careful now, keeping a tighter rein on our
speculations. I suspect, and hope, that Sokal's hoax might have a similarly healthy effect.
(c) The vacuity of post-Modernism as a tool for the political left: Here's the kicker. By the lights of Scientific
Realism, Sokal couldn't possibly have shown the vacuity of post-Modernism. By the realist criteria of Logic and
evidence, his article is an abject failure—a menagerie, as noted, of Straw Men, Weak Analogies, Slippery
Slopes, etc. So he can only claim to have succeeded, by some other criteria. But that requires recognizing that
there are relevant criteria, in which case it's not really vacuous after all. There is no recognizable distinction
between good nonsense and bad nonsense for the ideology of scientific realism. It can't be well done; it can only
be half-baked—but Sokal's article was well done. The discussions that lead to his blatantly ridiculous assertions
do indeed, in some sense, "lead" to them. His article does show some things, but manages to do so only because
of the efficacy of the very same rhetorical strategies he is supposedly exposing. Sarcasm and ridicule are indeed
effective—but, like hyperbole, metaphor, and other tropes, they are only Rhetorically effective. There is nothing
"Logical" about them!

IV. Conclusions.
There is a fly in the ointment. What if, regardless of how far in his cheek Sokal's tongue may have been, some of
the fanciful connections he made, or the overstated assertions he pretended to have inferred, or his avowedly
ersatz arguments, contain, or even just point to, "satisfactory, insightful, or compelling interpretations" of the
phenomena? Some have indeed argued as much. Would it matter whether he repudiated them? Are the profound
arguments against theism that Tolstoy put in Ivan Karamazov's mouth any less profound simply because their

author preferred Alyosha Karamazov's naive pietism? How can we take anything from the article when neither
the rhetoric of logic nor the logic of rhetoric will allow it?
Perhaps the fly is only caught in a fly-bottle rather than stuck in an ointment. The way out is to recognize that on
the one hand the adversarial and bivalent rhetoric of logic is an illusion and on the other the logic of rhetoric is an
unwarranted extrapolation of the logic of interpretation. Stories are told in many ways and need to be interpreted
in many ways. Looking for logical coherence is one of those ways, but so is looking for the inspiration that will
lead to insight. (Isn't this something the rhetoricians should have been saying?) That still leaves us with the hard
work of devising the new rhetoric for logic and revising the logic of rhetoric but, fortunately for me, that would
take us beyond the time allowed for this paper.

Notes
1. Lodge 1985, pp. 28-29.
2. The locus classicus for the argument-as-war paradigm is Lakoff and Johnson 1980.
3. This is discussed at length in Cohen 1995.
4. Sokal 1996b and 1996c.
5. Sokal 1996a, p. 222.
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